Eternalism (future artefacts)

maintaining that predictions refer to artefacts after all, precisely as they purport to do.

The problem we then face is to explain how they can do so at the time of designing (289).
Eternalism (future artefacts)

the importance of *time* itself:

namely by adopting an *eternalist theory of time*, according to which everything there is in the (concrete) world - notably artefacts - inhabits a region of a 4-dimensional space-time continuum, such that past and present entities have no privileged status over future ones. (289)
Eternalism (future artefacts)

In other words, future entities are considered just as ‘real’ as present ones. The predictions then reduce to mere descriptions of future artefacts (289)
**Eternalism (future artefacts)**

«Quadridimensionalismo»

Gli oggetti hanno parti materiali (che stanno nello spazio) e parti temporali (che stanno nel tempo).
In breve, agli oggetti vengono associate anche proprietà temporali
Eternalism (future artefacts)

«Quadridimensionalismo»

Gli oggetti hanno parti materiali (che stanno nello spazio) e parti temporali (che stanno nel tempo).
In breve, agli oggetti vengono associate anche proprietà temporali

«Quadridimensionalismo»: passato/presente/futuro come una sola dimensione temporale

«Presentismo»: solo il presente esiste
Eternalism (future artefacts)

Gli artefatti del progetto sono sempre gli stessi. Cambiano solo le loro proprietà temporali.

Artefatto X-al mattino = Artefatto X-alla sera
Eternalism (*future artefacts*)

Gli artefatti del progetto sono sempre gli stessi. Cambiano solo le loro proprietà temporali.

Artefatto X-al mattino = Artefatto X-alla sera

L’artefatto rappresentato è lo stesso che viene realizzato. L’unica differenza è la parte temporale che lo compone.


**Eternalism (future artefacts)**

**Seed Questions**

**Subject area of design:** *future artefacts* (289)

Knowing the truth: we can know about them [...] because they are of the same nature and ontological stature as past and present artefacts (289).
Eternalism (future artefacts)

Seed Questions

Problematiche:

- "it only works for our purposes if we assume that every act of designing eventually leads to the production of an artefact; otherwise there would not always be a ‘future artefact’ for the designer to describe (make predictions about) at the time of designing" (289)

[to explain (away) the fact that design is often undertaken as part of a project that is given up before any artefact is produced]

- the eternalist view would also have to be defended against arguments in support of the incompatible thesis that ‘the past is different from the future because the past exists and the future does not’.
Realismo modale e artefatti possibili
Realismo modale e artefatti possibili

the idea of possible artefacts existing in other possible worlds than the world that is actual at the time of designing (289)
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David K. Lewis’ modal realism will do for this purpose; i.e., the view that possible worlds exist just like the actual world of ours.
Realismo modale e artefatti possibili

David K. Lewis’ modal realism will do for this purpose; i.e., the view that possible worlds exist just like the actual world of ours.

Rispetto a un problema come quello del progetto e dell’artefatto attualmente assente è una posizione problematica
(dovremmo supporre che il possibile stia sullo stesso piano dell’attuale e di ciò che è presente)
**Thomasson-Ingarden «abstract artefacts»**

**Roman Ingarden** (1893 – 1970) was a Polish phenomenologist, ontologist and aesthetician. A student of Edmund Husserl's from the Göttingen period, Ingarden was a realist phenomenologist. (*The Literary Work of Art* 1973 [1926])

**Amie Thomasson** (1968) Professor of Philosophy at Dartmouth College. Works in the areas of metaphysics, philosophical methodology and metaontology, philosophy of art, philosophy of social and cultural objects, philosophy of mind and phenomenology. (*Fiction and Metaphysics* 1999)
She follows convention in seeing abstract entities as non-spatiotemporal (neither located in space nor time), but she does not accept the received assumption that they are also eternal and immutable.

In her view, they can be created, changed and destroyed (292)
She follows convention in seeing abstract entities as non-spatiotemporal (neither located in space nor time), but she does not accept the received assumption that they are also eternal and immutable.

In her view, *they can be created, changed and destroyed* (292)

**Existential dependence!**
Thomasson-Ingarden «abstract artefacts»

a fictional character (Sherlock Holmes, for example) depends for its existence on

[1] ‘the creative acts of its author or authors’, and on

The literary work in turn, depends (like the character) on

[2.1] a creative act of authoring (‘the acts of its creator’), but also on
[2.2] ‘some copy or memory of it’

and on

[2.3] ‘an audience capable of comprehending it’

(Thomasson 1999: 36)
Sherlock Holmes came into existence when Conan Doyle first wrote about him, and 

Holmes would cease to exist if all copies of all stories about him disappeared and no one remembered the stories (292)
So if we accept the Thomasson-Ingarden category of abstract artefacts as a realm of entities brought into existence by creative acts of writers of fiction, why then should we not accept similar abstract artefacts as the results of designers’ creative acts?

Designers obviously use different means of expression, such as technical specifications and drawings, rather than story telling, but that seems irrelevant.
The (as yet abstract) dwelling depends for its existence on

[1’] the designer’s creative act of conceiving of the dwelling, and on
[2’] the design documentation,

which in turn would depend on

[2.1’] the designer’s creative act of producing the documentation,

on [2.2’] there being some copy of the documentation,

and on [2.3’] an audience capable of comprehending it (293)
**Thomasson-Ingarden «abstract artefacts»**

**Seed Questions**

*Subject area of design*: the kind of abstract artefacts (in Thomasson’s terms) that can be described by the same means by which we describe ordinary, concrete artefacts (293)
Thomasson-Ingarden «abstract artefacts»

Seed Questions

Subject area of design: the kind of abstract artefacts (in Thomasson’s terms) that can be described by the same means by which we describe ordinary, concrete artefacts (293)

Knowing the truth: Possiamo conoscere la verità perché i progetti descrivono gli artefatti concreti (una volta che questi vengono prodotti)
Knowing the truth: Possiamo conoscere la verità perché i progetti descrivono gli artefatti concrete (una volta che questi vengono prodotti)

[il progetto definisce artefatti astratti, però questo stesso progetto è una descrizione degli artefatti concrete]

[cozza con la definizione di ‘artefatto pratico’]

[problema concreto-astratto]
Regions of space
Regions of space

A region is a portion of 3-D space, a place that can be void or filled with material.

Given a region of a manageable size, shape and position, we can fill it with material, or we can remove material from it;

but the region itself remains unaffected by such activity; indeed by any event whatsoever.

(I see no way of conceiving of regions other than as timeless and immutable) (294-295)
### Regions of space

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Temporal location</th>
<th>Spatial location (3-D)</th>
<th>Category</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Concrete entity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Period</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Region (3-D)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Abstract entity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Regions of space
Regions of space
Regions of space

The attack (9/11) affected their material, not the region of space they occupied. Regions are also there before the material we fill into them (295)
Regions of space

The predictions of design can be understood and paraphrased as predicating dispositional properties of regions of space in terms of effects of filling them with material in certain ways (295)
A glass has certain *dispositions*, for example the disposition to shatter when struck. But what is this disposition? It seems on the one hand to be a perfectly real property, a genuine respect of similarity common to glasses, china cups, and anything else fragile. Yet on the other hand, the glass's disposition seems mysterious, ‘ethereal’ (as Goodman (1954) put it) in a way that, say, its size and shape are not. For its disposition, it seems, has to do only with its *possibly shattering in certain conditions*. In general, it seems that nothing about the *actual* behavior of an object is ever necessary for it to have the dispositions it has. Many objects differ from one another with respect to their dispositions in virtue of their merely possible behaviors, and this is a mysterious way for objects to differ.

At the time of designing, *the region is there for us to refer to, and the material is somewhere for us to refer to*, but it does not matter what particular pebbles, grains of sand etc. are used, so specific reference is unnecessary (295)
Regions of space
Seed Questions

Subject area of design: regions of 3-D space

Knowing the truth: everyday or scientific accumulation of experience (295)
Knowing the truth: everyday or scientific accumulation of experience (295)

For example, the prediction about a prospective house, that ‘the column it has at that corner will safely carry its share of the weight of the roof’

might be construed as a shorthand for saying

of a certain column-shaped region $c$, that if $c$ is filled with such-and-such material (say, concrete), and such-and-such a load is imposed on the material, it remains within $c$ (295)
Regions of space

a serious limitation of this particular worldview that it is biased towards understanding design and production of material artefacts (296)

there are non-material kinds of artefacts such as software, organisations, etc. that are designed, and it remains to be seen if and to what extent regionism can be generalised to account for such phenomena (297)
Any kind of answers to the Seed Questions here presented has at least one problem to deal with.
Any kind of answers to the Seed Questions here presented has at least one problem to deal with.

They still remain open!